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Abstract
Although stakeholder theory is widely accepted in environmental disclosure 
research, empirical evidence about the role of stakeholders in firms’ 
disclosure is still scarce. The authors address this issue for a setting of carbon 
disclosure. Our international sample comprises the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) Global 500, S&P 500, and FTSE 350 reports from 2008 to 
2011, resulting in a total of 1,120 firms with 3,631 firm-year observations. 
The authors apply Tobit regressions to analyze the relationship between 
carbon disclosure and the relevance of the following stakeholder groups: 
government, general public, media, employees, and customers. Our results 
confirm that in addition to carbon performance, all stakeholders are 
associated with carbon disclosure. Only one stakeholder group (government) 
acts as a moderator for the relationship between carbon performance and 
carbon disclosure. Furthermore, the authors find that carbon performance 
but not the affiliation to a carbon-intensive industry acts as a moderator 
between stakeholder relevance and carbon disclosure.
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The impacts of climate change have created a substantial demand on firms 
regarding their carbon disclosure. Various groups of non-financial stakehold-
ers, such as governments, the general public, the media, employees, and cus-
tomers as well as financial market participants, ask for information about a 
firm’s efforts to address climate-change risks. The motivation behind this 
request for carbon disclosure is manifold. For example, governments evalu-
ate whether mandatory carbon disclosure is necessary and seek input on pro-
spective legislation. Furthermore, given increased environmental sensitivity, 
employees and customers have also started to pay attention to firms’ disclosed 
carbon performance for better-informed decision-making.
This investigation builds on more than three decades of research on the 
determinants of corporate environmental disclosure (Cormier & Magnan, 
2003; De Villiers & van Staden, 2011; Hughes, Anderson, & Golden, 2001; 
Ingram & Frazier, 1980; Patten, 1991), which we adopt to climate change, and 
thereby to the carbon disclosure context. Often it is argued that a firm’s moti-
vation to voluntarily disclose carbon or more general environmental informa-
tion originates—at least in part—from stakeholder pressure (Clarkson, Li, 
Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008; Patten, 2002; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Stanny, 
2013). Stakeholders demand to be informed about a firm’s performance and 
related activities and can pressure firms to disclose such information (Clarkson, 
1995). However, the relevance of different stakeholder groups is not reflected 
in most empirical analyses with a few exceptions (Perez-Batres, Doh, Miller, 
& Pisani, 2012; Sprengel & Busch, 2011). Prior literature focuses on the rela-
tionship between environmental disclosure and environmental performance 
and often applies only financial market-oriented control variables and finan-
cial stakeholders. It is argued that this limitation is one reason for the inconsis-
tent results regarding these relationships (Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; 
Wood & Jones, 1995). We elucidate this important issue by including different 
non-financial stakeholder groups in the empirical model as independent vari-
ables and as interaction terms and by answering two research questions:
Research Question 1: Which non-financial stakeholder groups are rele-
vant for a firm’s carbon disclosure?
Research Question 2: How do the relevant non-financial stakeholders 
moderate the relationship between carbon performance and carbon 
disclosure?
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A widely used disclosure medium in the climate-change context is the 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). The CDP is an organization headquartered 
in the United Kingdom that works with shareholders and corporations to dis-
close greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (which are referred to as carbon per-
formance in the remainder of this article). The CDP sends questionnaires 
regarding corporate carbon management and performance to the world’s 
largest firms and encourages them to disclose their climate-change-related 
information by answering the questionnaire and legitimizing its publication 
via the CDP. With the focus on carbon disclosure, we choose a narrow field 
of environmental disclosure. However, the issue of climate change is very 
prominent in politics and the media because researchers proclaim that it has 
already transgressed its planetary boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009). Thus, 
the issue of carbon performance is one of the most important fields of disclo-
sure for firms, shareholders, and other stakeholders (Busch & Hoffmann, 
2011).
In this study, the authors consider the government, the general public, the 
media, employees, and customers as non-financial stakeholder groups. We 
compare a model with and without stakeholder variables. We then addition-
ally apply interaction models to assess whether the stakeholders act as mod-
erators for the relationship between carbon performance and carbon 
disclosure. We also investigate the differences between good and poor carbon 
performers and between firms from carbon-intensive and non-carbon-inten-
sive industries. Our research builds on a worldwide sample from the three 
major CDP reports (Global 500, S&P 500, and FTSE 350) and covers the 
years 2008 to 2011, resulting in a total sample of 3,631 observations.
This study contributes to the literature on environmental disclosure in sev-
eral ways. First, we analyze the relationship between carbon performance 
and carbon disclosure. Second, we expand current literature (Luo, Lan, & 
Tang, 2012; Stanny, 2013; Stanny & Ely, 2008) which is focusing on inves-
tors by analyzing the relationship between the relevance of a variety of non-
financial stakeholder groups and carbon disclosure. Third, we explore 
whether the relevance of stakeholder groups for a firm moderates the rela-
tionship between carbon performance and carbon disclosure. Fourth, using a 
large cross-sectional sample of firms, we investigate whether there is a differ-
ence in carbon disclosure behavior between good and poor carbon perform-
ers and between carbon-intensive and non-carbon-intensive industries (Reid 
& Toffel, 2009). Therefore, we can expand current literature which is focused 
on environmental (carbon) intensive firms. In addition, the international CDP 
sample (similar to Luo et al., 2012) allows us to explore the relationship of 
country-specific stakeholder variables with carbon disclosure and thus to 
expand current literature which is dominated by samples of U.S. firms.
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The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section con-
tains a literature review on the theoretical foundations of the relationship 
between carbon disclosure and carbon performance, followed by the devel-
opment of our hypotheses. Thereafter, we explain our research design and 
provide some information and descriptive statistics about our sample. Finally, 
we present and discuss our results and draw conclusions.
Literature Review and Theoretical Considerations
Stakeholder Theory and Stakeholder Relevance
The relationship between carbon performance and carbon disclosure is an 
important issue because stakeholders (such as the government, the general 
public, the media, employees, and customers) are increasingly interested in 
the carbon performance of firms given that planetary boundaries, perceived 
as resource scarcity, have emerged as an issue. Therefore, it is useful for a 
firm to be held accountable to the relevant stakeholders who have a stake in 
knowing how the resources entrusted to a firm are used (Schaltegger & 
Burritt, 2000) to obtain a “contract to continue its operations” (Deegan, 2002, 
p. 293). The degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder 
claims is termed stakeholder salience (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Firms 
are dependent on the external stakeholders who control the resources critical 
to corporate performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In fact, it is the depen-
dence of firms on climate-change actors (external stakeholders) for resources 
that gives those actors leverage over a firm (Frooman, 1999). Organizations 
could not survive if they were not responsive to the demands of the groups in 
their environments, who are thus enabled to influence organizational out-
comes (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Stakeholder theory, as a very flexible socio-political concept, emerged 
with different interpretations distinguishing between managerial, legal, and 
ethical approaches (Fassin, 2009). Building on the managerial view, “[b]usi-
ness can be understood as a set of relationships among groups that have a 
stake in the activities that make up the business. Business is about how 
[stakeholders] interact and create value” (Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2007, 
p. 3). In a broad stakeholder definition, “Any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” 
(Freeman, 1984, p. 25) holds a stake in the firm. Narrow views, however, 
account for limited organizational resources, time, and attention as well as 
the managers’ patience in addressing stakeholders and their claims (Mitchell 
et al., 1997). Over time, various different stakeholder classifications emerged, 
for instance, primary versus secondary stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995), 
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normative versus derivative versus dormant stakeholders (Phillips, 2003), or 
urgent and/or powerful and/or legitimate stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997).
The salience of stakeholders can arise from stakeholders with powerful, 
urgent, and/or legitimate claims. The number of attributes held by stakehold-
ers coincides with the level of pressure that they can exert with respect to 
their stakes (Mitchell et al., 1997). Wood (1991) argues that social respon-
siveness approaches may indeed characterize various organizational 
responses to social pressure. In this context, stakeholder salience helps to 
explain “to whom and to what managers actually pay attention” (Mitchell et 
al., 1997, p. 854). This definition was further specified to the “attention, time 
and priority managers accord to the stakeholder’s environmental demands” 
(Gago & Antolin, 2004, p. 68). Eesley and Lenox (2006, p. 765f) defined 
salience “in terms of whether firms are likely to respond to stakeholder 
requests for action and by proposing that power, legitimacy, and urgency 
arise out of the nature of stakeholder–request–firm triplets.” Neville, Bell, 
and Whitwell (2011, p. 369) define stakeholder salience as “the prioritization 
of stakeholder claims by managers based on their perception of the degree of 
power of the stakeholder and the degree of moral legitimacy and urgency of 
the claim.” These notions build on the assumption that managers have incen-
tives to consider particular stakeholders. Carbon disclosure is a way of satis-
fying salient stakeholders and reflects an adaptive management approach to 
address a dynamic, multidimensional environment, and an ability to meet 
social pressure and respond to societal needs (Hackston & Milne, 1996). To 
take into account the specific context of disclosure, we define “stakeholder 
relevance” as the measurable influence of a specific stakeholder group on the 
decisions of the firm.
Various groups of stakeholders, such as the government, the general pub-
lic, the media, employees, and customers ask for information about a firm’s 
efforts to manage climate-change impacts. The motivation behind a request 
for disclosure is manifold. Governments evaluate whether mandatory disclo-
sure is necessary and seek input on prospective legislation. For example, the 
European Commission (2011, p. 15) released a commitment to “present a 
legislative proposal on the transparency of the social and environmental 
information provided by companies in all sectors” (Single Market Act, SEC, 
(2011), p. 467). Through these serious attempts to mandate disclosure but 
without any obligatory disclosure regulation, the specific stakeholder gov-
ernment has an enormous stake in environmental (carbon) disclosure 
(Clarkson, 1995; Huang & Kung, 2010; Patten, 2002; Wilmshurst & Frost, 
2000). Given increased sensitivity regarding climate change, employees have 
also started to pay attention to a firm’s disclosed carbon performance (Baron, 
2009; Huang & Kung, 2010). Moreover, many customers’ conscience 
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regarding climate change has obliged companies to adopt pertinent policies 
and to report their carbon performance (Moneva & Llena, 2000; Munilla & 
Miles, 2005). In addition, the general public is interested in the carbon per-
formance of businesses and can pressure the government to put in place new 
regulations or to intensify the existing ones (O’Dwyer, 2002; Weaver, 
Trevino, & Cochran, 1999). Private parties, either individually or through a 
non-governmental organization (NGO), may sue companies for harmful cli-
mate behavior (Konar & Cohen, 1997). The general public requires carbon-
related information (Jenkins & Yakovleva, 2006). If an organization cannot 
justify its continued operation by reporting on its carbon performance, the 
community may revoke its license to continue operations (Deegan & Gordon, 
1996). Pressure from the general public to reduce emissions can be expected 
to have an influence on any company that has a substantial stake in the com-
munity. Finally, as a consequence of increased public awareness, the media 
have discovered climate change as a topic that captures public attention 
(Baron, 2009; Clarkson, 1995). Through its priming and framing effects, the 
media coverage directly influences audience attention (Dawkins & Fraas, 
2011; Entman, 2006). The increased media coverage of climate science sig-
nals a shift in public opinion and public attitudes toward carbon-intensive 
businesses (Dawkins & Fraas, 2011). However, despite the stakeholders’ 
need for carbon information, the relevant studies on the relationship between 
carbon performance and carbon disclosure have only selectively included 
stakeholders in their analyses of environmental (carbon) disclosure and envi-
ronmental (carbon) performance (Clarkson et al., 2008; Huang & Kung, 
2010; Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez, 2010), whereas stakeholders are a 
common antecedent, moderator or mediator variable in the related research 
field on the relationship between corporate environmental performance and 
corporate financial performance (Guenther & Hoppe, 2014).
Corporate Environmental Performance and Disclosure
Scholars have found positive, negative, and insignificant relationships 
between environmental (and more recently carbon) performance and envi-
ronmental (carbon) disclosure. Table 1 highlights these relationships. It also 
gives an overview of about previous literature in terms of geographical scope, 
investigated industry sectors as well as use of performance variables and dis-
closure variables. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that the existing studies often 
focus on only one country (predominantly the United States). An exception is 
a study by Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010), who use a global sam-
ple of 283 firms from 28 countries. These authors investigate predominantly 
carbon-intensive industries from a few selected sectors for which data are 
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Table 1. Studies Investigating the Environmental (Carbon) Performance–Disclosure Relationship.
Reference, journal, sample, 
geographical scope Sectors
   Relation 
performance/ 
   disclosure Stakeholder inclusion/(variable)
Environmental 
performance 
variable
Disclosure medium/
(disclosure measure, 
self-defined: yes/no)
Iatridis (2013), Emerging 
Markets Revenue, N = 529, 
Malaysia
Environmentally 
intensive industries
Positive Media (Janis Fadner coefficient) Hazardous waste, 
initiative to 
reduce waste
(Clarkson, Li, Richardson, 
& Vasvari, 2008 
checklist, no)
Zeng, Xu, Yin, and Tam 
(2012), J Bus Ethics, N = 
2,361, China
Manufacturing 
companies
Positive Regulatory pressure (dummies: 
government owned company, 
environmentally sensitive industry
Dummy 
environmentally 
sensitive industry
Annual reports (10-point 
checklist, yes)
Cho, Guidry, Hageman, and 
Patten (2012), AOS, N = 92, 
United States
Environmentally 
intensive industries
Negative Media (Newsweek environmental 
reputation score)
Environmental 
Impact Score 
Trucost
Annual report, 10-K 
report, CSR Report 
(Clarkson et al., 2008 
checklist, no)
De Villiers and van Staden 
(2011), JAPP, N = 129, 
United States
Cross-sectional Negative Creditor (leverage ratio, equity/ debt 
raised in fiscal year)
KLD, TRI Annual report and 
websites (word count, 
yes)
Dawkins and Fraas (2011), J 
Bus Ethics, N = 344, United 
States
Cross-sectional Positive Media visibility (Google News 
Archive)
Ceres, KLD, 
Trucost
Ceres questionnaire (No 
vs. incomplete vs. full 
disclosure, yes)
Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-
Sanchez (2010), J Bus Ethics, 
N = 283, Global
Cross-sectional 
(excluding finance 
and insurance 
industries)
Positive Stakeholder orientation (code-law 
vs. common law country), legal 
enforcement (strength of legal 
infrastructure), public pressure 
(NCRI), board (percentage women; 
independent members, CEO = 
Chairman), creditor (indebtedness)
GHG emissions CDP questionnaire 
(CDLI Score, no)
Clarkson et al. (2008), AOS, 
N = 191, United States
Environmentally 
intensive industries
Positive Media (Janis Fadner coefficient), 
creditor (leverage ratio, equity/ 
debt raised in fiscal year)
TRI, toxic waste 
recycling 
percentage
Environment report, web 
disclosures (95-point 
checklist, yes)
(continued)
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Reference, journal, sample, 
geographical scope Sectors
   Relation 
performance/ 
   disclosure Stakeholder inclusion/(variable)
Environmental 
performance 
variable
Disclosure medium/
(disclosure measure, 
self-defined: yes/no)
Cho and Patten (2007), AOS, 
N = 100, United States
Cross-sectional Negative — KLD 10-K report (8 point 
checklist, yes)
Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, and 
Hughes (2004), AOS, N = 
198, United States
Environmentally 
intensive industries
Positive Public visibility (WSJ news) Toxic waste 
recycling 
percentage
10-K report (4-point 
checklist, yes)
Patten (2002), AOS, N = 131, 
United States
Four environmentally 
intensive industries
Negative — TRI Annual report (8-point 
checklist, yes)
Hughes, Anderson, and 
Golden (2001), JAPP, N = 
51, United States
Cross-sectional Negative — Ranking from U.S. 
CEP
Annual report (4-point 
checklist, yes)
Freedman and Wasley (1990), 
APIA, N = 50, United States
Four environmentally 
intensive industries
Insignificant — Ranking from U.S. 
CEP
Annual report and 
10-K report (4-point 
checklist, yes)
Wiseman (1982), AOS, N = 
26, United States
Three environmentally 
intensive industries
Insignificant — Ranking from U.S. 
CEP
Annual report (4-point 
checklist, yes)
Ingram and Frazier (1980), 
JAR, N = 40, United States
Four environmentally 
intensive industries
Insignificant — Ranking from U.S. 
CEP
Annual report (4-point 
checklist, yes)
Note. The studies by Huang and Kung (2010) and Stanny (2013) are not reported because neither study measures an environmental performance variable. Variables for 
stakeholder inclusion are only reported if stakeholder variables are explicitly addressed in the studies. Thus, control variables, especially financial controls such as RoA, 
RoE, or Tobin’s Q are not reported. The table shows the measures as applied in the respective studies, regardless of whether the variables capture stakeholder relevance 
or not. J Bus Ethics = Journal of Business Ethics; AOS = Accounting, Organizations and Society; CSR = corporate social responsibility; JAPP = Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy; KLD = Kinder Lydenberg & Domini; TRI = Toxic Release Inventory; NCRI = National Corporate Responsibility Index; GHG = greenhouse gas; CDP = Carbon 
Disclosure Project; CDLI = Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index; WSJ = Wall Street Journal; CEP = U.S. council of economic priorities; APIA = Advances in Public Interest 
Accounting; JAR = Journal of Accounting Research.
Table 1. (continued)
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accessible. Five studies (Cho & Patten, 2007; Dawkins & Fraas, 2011; De 
Villiers & van Staden, 2011; Hughes et al., 2001; Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-
Sanchez, 2010) have a wider scope of industries.
In general, the KLD Social Ratings Database and Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI) or the rankings from the U.S. Council on Economic 
Priorities are used in the reviewed studies to measure environmental perfor-
mance (Table 1). GHG emissions are addressed only in the study by Prado-
Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010). For environmental disclosure, most 
studies analyze the non-discretionary media for disclosure, such as annual 
or 10-K reports, using a code-book-based content analysis. Dawkins and 
Fraas (2011), however, analyze discretionary environmental disclosure 
using Ceres data and a measure for the type of response to the Ceres ques-
tionnaire. Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) use the Carbon 
Disclosure Leadership Index (CDLI) score from the CDP. Sample sizes 
vary between 26 firms for Wiseman (1982) to 344 for Dawkins and Fraas 
(2011), with small sample sizes for older studies and larger sample sizes in 
the more recent studies. We expand the current empirical studies by using a 
large, global, and cross-sectional sample, by including a variety of stake-
holder groups with different measures for stakeholder relevance and by 
using an objective measure for carbon disclosure delivered by a third party, 
the CDP. Busch and Hoffmann (2011) argue that in empirical research, an 
issue must be material for a firm to find a relationship with disclosure. They 
conclude that climate change is perceived to be such an issue because of the 
public and political attention. Following this position, we see a benefit in 
analyzing the relationship between stakeholder relevance and carbon 
disclosure.
For the field of carbon disclosure and in light of the relevance of climate 
change as a material business issue, we expect that low emissions and thus a 
better carbon performance is associated with more carbon disclosure 
(Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, & Hughes, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008). Thus, we 
formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypotheses 1 (H1): A firm’s carbon performance is positively associated 
with its carbon disclosure.
Concerning stakeholder inclusion, most studies presented in Table 1 only 
address stakeholder impact in general and explicitly address mostly measures 
for shareholders and creditors. Specific stakeholders, such as the media or the 
general public, are addressed by only some authors (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; 
Clarkson et al., 2008; Dawkins & Fraas, 2011; Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-
Sanchez, 2010).
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Huang and Kung (2010) address a wider range of stakeholders; however, 
their study is limited to Taiwanese carbon-intensive industries and does not 
include environmental performance. For the measurement of stakeholder 
groups, Huang and Kung (2010) apply firm-specific data as available from 
the financial statements. We widen the scope by analyzing a global sample of 
both carbon-intensive industries and non-carbon-intensive industries. 
Furthermore, we integrate a wider range of non-financial stakeholders and 
we hypothesize the following:
Hypotheses 2 (H2): The relevance of a firm’s stakeholders is positively 
associated with a firm’s carbon disclosure.
In addition to the direct relationship, we also investigate whether stake-
holder relevance acts as a moderator for the relationship between carbon per-
formance and carbon disclosure as analyzed by H1. Thus, we formulate the 
following:
Hypotheses 3 (H3): The relevance of a firm’s stakeholders acts a moderator 
for the relationship between carbon performance and carbon disclosure.
Firms with poor carbon performance might not only be inclined to dis-
close less carbon-related information. It is also possible that the relationships 
between stakeholder relevance variables and carbon disclosure are weaker 
for these firms. For example, a firm with poor carbon performance might 
prefer not to disclose this information in a country with strong GHG politics 
because it is afraid that disclosure might lead to more carbon-related regula-
tion or other public pressure. Furthermore, our sample consists of firms from 
carbon-intensive and non-carbon-intensive industries. It is likely that firms 
that are not active in carbon-intensive industries have a different motivation 
for carbon-related disclosure. A different motivation would lead to different 
relationships between stakeholder relevance and carbon disclosure, and thus 
we follow studies analyzing industry effects like Baird, Geylani, and Roberts 
(2012) and hypothesize that industry might have a moderating effect on dis-
closure. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypotheses 4a (H4a): Carbon performance acts as a moderator for the 
relationship between carbon disclosure and the relevance of the stake-
holder groups for the firm.
Hypotheses 4b (H4b): Industry affiliation acts as a moderator for the rela-
tionship between carbon disclosure and the relevance of the stakeholder 
groups for the firm.
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Background on the CDP
To disclose carbon information to the interested parties, the CDP asks firms 
worldwide to disclose information about their efforts to mitigate GHG 
emissions and to adapt to climate change. This initiative involves a new 
form of disclosure, as firms are required to answer a structured question-
naire about their carbon performance instead of applying a set of rules to an 
environmental or a sustainability report, as under the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI; 2013a, 2013b). When firms respond to a questionnaire, it 
becomes more obvious when they choose not to disclose information, 
because they choose not to answer a question. Thus, the CDP provides a 
voluntary disclosure setting with little discretion (Luo et al., 2012), mean-
ing that the firms cannot easily distract from poor carbon performance. The 
CDP assesses the firm responses in a qualitative and quantitative way. As a 
third party and being distinct from the disclosing firm and the information-
seeking stakeholders, the CDP provides an appropriate measure for carbon 
disclosure.
By drawing on the CDP, this article investigates the effectiveness of an 
initiative that seeks to better link sustainability challenges and financial mar-
kets. The CDP represents 722 institutional investors and creditors, including 
the world’s largest banks (such as BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Barclays 
Bank, and JPMorgan Chase & Co.), with a combined US$87 trillion under 
management (CDP, 2013). The CDP seeks information from firms on their 
sustainability performance to disclose it to various stakeholders and, above 
all, to the financial markets. Several actors in sustainable investment such as 
Triodos Bank partner with the CDP (Triodos, 2013). Behind the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index, CDP is the second best known sustainability rating and 
ranking and is regarded to be the best in terms of credibility across sustain-
ability experts (SustainAbility, 2012). Thus, the CDP information is available 
for making contemporary sustainable investment decisions. Many firms also 
participate in the CDP to attract capital from sustainability oriented investors. 
For example, Siemens explicitly mentions its participation in the CDP and 
the awarded disclosure score on its webpage on Socially Responsible 
Investment (Siemens, 2015).
Furthermore, in comparison with other actors in the field of sustainable 
investment, the CDP explicitly targets climate change, which represents a clear 
constraint on all carbon-intensive industries due to the transgression of the 
planetary boundaries and a unique opportunity for the renewable energy sector. 
Our contribution focuses on climate change as a major issue in sustainability 
investment and the financial markets. This consideration is deeply needed 
given the somewhat paradoxical situation that despite the interest of several 
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stakeholders, such as equity market participants or governments, in ecological 
sustainability, global CO2 emissions are increasing (Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, 2013).
Research Design
The authors apply a regression model to estimate the carbon disclosure score 
by using as independent variables the carbon performance, the relevance of 
the stakeholder groups and control variables. The dependent variable is the 
Carbon Disclosure score. In the following, we describe all variables in the 
regression models in detail. Note that we structure the variables according to 
the non-financial stakeholder groups government, general public, media, 
employees, and customers. Shareholders and creditors are also stakeholder 
groups, but they are regarded as control variables because we focus on non-
financial stakeholder groups. All financial measures are derived from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream Worldscope, and we indicate other data sources 
in the following variable descriptions.
Carbon Disclosure Score
As a measure of carbon disclosure, we apply the CDP carbon disclosure 
score. The disclosure score measures whether and how well a firm responds 
to each question from the CDP questionnaire. The measure is publicly avail-
able and scores the four sections of the CDP questionnaire: (a) risk and 
opportunities; (b) emission accounting, verification, and trading; (c) perfor-
mance; and (d) governance. A firm is awarded points if it reports its GHG 
emissions, but the actual amount of emissions does not affect the score (CDP, 
2008). Hence, the disclosure score solely measures disclosure, not perfor-
mance. The scoring accounts for sector-specific issues and includes stand-
alone questions that apply to all firms, as well as lead questions that are the 
first in a series of questions and solicit a yes or no answer. The disclosure 
score ranges from 0 (no answers given) to 100 (complete disclosure). For the 
firms that choose not to answer the CDP questionnaire, we apply a disclosure 
score of 0. This decision is in accordance with the prior literature (Clarkson 
et al., 2008).
Although CDP disclosure is applied in empirical environmental disclosure 
studies (Luo et al., 2012; Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Reid & 
Toffel, 2009; Stanny, 2013), the earlier CDP disclosures were criticized 
because the CDP questionnaire was subject to considerable changes during 
the early years (2003-2006), and sustainability professionals had some doubts 
about the provided information (Kolk, Levy, & Pinkse, 2008). The CDP 
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further developed the climate-change questionnaire to improve the reliability 
of the data. Therefore, we start analyzing the CDP reports in 2008, after 
which point any changes in the questionnaire were less substantial. 
Furthermore, in a survey by Globescan and SustainAbility in June 2012 with 
850 sustainability professionals responding from 70 countries, the CDP lead-
ership index achieved the highest credibility for all included sustainability 
ratings and rankings (SustainAbility, 2012). This result confirms that the 
CDP is not only of interest to recent empirical research but could consider-
ably improve its credibility for sustainability professionals.
Carbon Performance
As explained above, we hypothesize from recent literature (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Dawkins & Fraas, 2011; Prado-Lorenzo & 
Garcia-Sanchez, 2010) and argue that carbon performance is positively asso-
ciated with carbon disclosure. Accordingly, we measure carbon performance 
as the value of the estimated CO2 emissions (Scope 1 and Scope 2) divided 
by total assets in the year prior to the CDP disclosure. The values are derived 
from Thomson Reuters Asset4 and Worldscope. To account for different lev-
els of CO2 emissions among different industries, we z-standardize the value 
by year and industry, based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
supersectors.1 Note that we apply the negative sign to this measure for easier 
interpretation and comparison with other studies (Clarkson et al., 2008). 
Therefore, the measure of carbon performance is high when carbon perfor-
mance is good (when CO2 emissions are low) and vice versa.
Government
GHG politics captures one environmental dimension of the stakeholder gov-
ernment. It is measured as the perception of a country’s national and interna-
tional climate politics as provided by Germanwatch for the year prior to the 
CDP disclosure. Germanwatch is an organization concerned with environ-
mental and social issues, and it publishes an index of climate protection. One 
of the dimensions of this index evaluates the climate protection oriented poli-
cies of approximately 50 countries based on answers to a questionnaire by 
climate-change experts. GHG politics is the negative value of the score pro-
vided by Germanwatch and ranges from −5 (very poor GHG politics) to −1 
(very good GHG politics). We expect that countries with good GHG politics 
are more successful in motivating firms to improve their carbon disclosure. 
Kolk and Perego (2010) as well as Chen and Bouvain (2009) argue that a 
country’s institutional setting and its arrangements regarding environmental 
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issues have an influence on the reporting behavior of firms. We follow the 
prior literature by assuming that a firm’s home country is of primary impor-
tance to its disclosure behavior (Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Luo et al., 2012). 
Freedman and Jaggi (2005) show that a firm’s disclosure decision is more 
strongly connected to its home country than to the countries in which it 
operates.
General Public
The relevance of the stakeholder group general public is measured by an 
indicator that captures how the general public can make its needs heard and 
accounted for by the government (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). 
This variable is measured using the Voice and Accountability measure as pro-
vided by the World Governance Index (WGI) for the year prior to the CDP 
disclosure.2 The WGI provides dimensions of governance measured for over 
200 countries. Voice and accountability captures the ability of people to influ-
ence politics. Climate change is an issue that is discussed intensely in the 
media and by many interest groups. Accordingly, the ability of the general 
public to make itself heard and to influence judicial processes is important to 
firms’ disclosure decisions and should be positively associated with carbon 
disclosure.
Media
The relevance of media is measured by the sum of all controversies faced by 
a firm as reported in Thomson Reuters Asset4 for the year prior to the CDP 
disclosure.3 The media pays more attention to firms with controversies 
regardless of the reason for their occurrence. Such firms face the threat of 
protests or boycotts from customers and interest groups or even legal actions 
against the firm. Reid and Toffel (2009) show that the firms facing threats of 
regulation or the attention of activist groups (because they have been targeted 
by stakeholder actions on environmental issues) tend to increase their carbon 
disclosure. By engaging in carbon disclosure, firms can respond to public 
pressure and the media and report on their initiatives toward higher carbon 
performance. In addition, increased carbon disclosure might serve the pur-
pose of deflecting attention from controversies in other areas.
Employees
The relevance of employees to the firm is measured as the workforce/
employee quality score of the firm obtained from the Thomson Reuters 
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Asset4 Database in the year prior to the CDP disclosure. Firms with a stron-
ger employee orientation and which react on their employees as stakeholders 
obtain a higher score. Employees are an important interest group of firms; 
they directly influence firm performance through their productivity and their 
wages and salaries. Employees also provide indirect influence through labor 
unions and recruitment. Labor unions influence the development of wages 
and salaries and, accordingly, a firm’s profitability and value (Abowd, 1989). 
Furthermore, unionized labor is demonstrated as being related to financial 
risks due to the influence of unions on labor costs (Hansson, 2004; Rosett, 
2001). If there is a public understanding that GHG emissions should be low-
ered, then this pressure might also be executed through labor unions. Thus, a 
firm’s basis for negotiations should be improved when it discloses informa-
tion about its efforts to lower GHG emissions. In addition, prospective 
employees are concerned with more than just the current financial perfor-
mance of a firm and might also consider information regarding a firm’s car-
bon performance (Grolleau, Mzoughi, & Pekovic, 2012; Ilinitch, Soderstrom, 
& Thomas, 1998). Hence, providing such information might be helpful in 
attracting potential new employees. As a result, a firm that is concerned with 
its employees will also increase its carbon disclosure, both to attract new 
employees and to improve its relationships with current employees and labor 
unions.
Customers
The variable customers captures the relevance of customers for the firm and 
is measured by the client management score obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Asset4 in the year prior to the CDP disclosure. The client management score 
is an aggregate measure that considers different dimensions of customer ori-
entation via different sources. For example, it includes, among others, the 
dimensions of brand value, customer satisfaction, and innovative activities. A 
high score indicates a high customer orientation and thus a reaction of the 
firm on the relevance of this stakeholder group. Customers pay attention to a 
firm’s environmental disclosure (Ilinitch et al., 1998). Accordingly, firms use 
their carbon disclosure as a marketing tool to attract new customers and retain 
existing customers.
Control Variables
We follow previous studies and choose variables in a similar way. Financial 
performance is the return on equity (RoE), measured as the net income 
divided by the book value of the firm’s common equity in the year prior to the 
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CDP disclosure.4 This measure captures a firm’s performance from the share-
holders’ perspective. RoE also captures the resources that a firm has available 
to cover, among others, expenditures for carbon disclosure. Therefore, a firm 
with higher profits also has more resources to spend on quantity and quality 
of carbon disclosure (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006).
Leverage is measured by a firm’s total debt capital divided by total assets 
in the year prior to the CDP disclosure.5 It has been argued that leverage 
influences firms’ disclosure decisions (Clarkson et al., 2008; Leftwich, Watts, 
& Zimmerman, 1981) because firms with high leverage are more dependent 
on creditors and experience higher monitoring costs.
Volatility is measured by the stock price volatility based on the standard 
deviation of the market-adjusted monthly stock returns (Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Lim, 2001) in the year prior to the CDP disclosure.6 High volatility indicates 
a high level of information asymmetry, which negatively influences the cost 
of capital. Therefore, firms are motivated to voluntarily disclose information 
to lower information asymmetry and the cost of capital (Healy & Palepu, 
2001).
Size is the firm size and is measured by the common logarithm of total 
assets in the year prior to the CDP disclosure. Leuz and Wysocki (2008) note 
that large firms tend to disclose more information than small firms. We 
include firm size to account for this effect. Firm size is also a widely accepted 
control variable in voluntary disclosure studies (Botosan, 1997; Clarkson, 
Kao, & Richardson, 1999; Jones, 2007).
The variable capital investment is calculated as capital expenditures 
divided by total sales revenue in the year prior to the CDP disclosure. Firms 
with relatively high capital investments should have newer equipment. 
Clarkson et al. (2008) argue that newer equipment will be more state of the 
art and thus helps to improve carbon performance.7 Therefore, firms with 
newer equipment are more inclined to increase disclosure to inform about 
their investment activities and the positive effects on carbon performance.
Code law captures the legal dimension of the stakeholder government. It 
is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 when the country’s legal system is 
based on code law and zero otherwise. There is a stronger political influence 
on accounting in code-law countries than in common-law countries. 
Accordingly, code-law countries are observed to motivate stakeholder-ori-
ented disclosure, such as carbon disclosure, while shareholder-oriented dis-
closure is prevalent for common-law countries (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 
2000; Luo et al., 2012; Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez, 2010). However, 
as regulations for stakeholder-oriented disclosure are tighter in code-law 
countries, firms might refrain from voluntary disclosure as much information 
is already publicly and mandatorily available. Code-law countries are 
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countries with a German, French, or Scandinavian legal origin. Common-law 
countries have an English legal origin (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 2008) and therefore mainly comprise English-speaking countries 
(Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and United States). Thus, we expect 
code-law countries to be associated with lower carbon disclosure.
The variable signatories represents institutional ownership and is mea-
sured as the percentage of shares held by institutional owners in the year prior 
to the CDP disclosure. An empirical study by Bushee and Noe (2000) finds a 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and higher levels of 
disclosure. Furthermore, the CDP’s signatories are institutional investors 
who may demand that the firms in which they invest increase their CDP dis-
closure. This effect has been empirically verified by Reid and Toffel (2009).
Year-control dummy variables capture time-specific effects that affect 
all firms; for example, there might be a lower carbon disclosure level in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. Industry-control denotes industry dummy 
variables that capture industry-specific effects. These control variables are 
defined according to the industry classification of CDP (as reported in 
Table 1).
Because firms can choose not to respond to the CDP, we apply Tobit 
regressions. Therefore, we account for the character of the dependent vari-
able carbon disclosure score as being cut off at 0 for the case of non-disclo-
sure. We analyze the determinants of the carbon disclosure score using the 
following model “All stake”:
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where subscript i denotes firms and t denotes years.
H1 is supported if the coefficient β1 is significant and positive, whereas 
H2 is confirmed for a specific stakeholder group if its respective coefficient 
(β2 through β6) is significant. We also estimate a model “No stake” without 
the stakeholder variables (GHG politics, general public, media, employees, 
and customers) to analyze whether this change leads to distorted results for 
carbon performance due to the omitted variable problem.
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To test H3, we introduce interaction terms for each stakeholder variable. 
For each stakeholder variable, we estimate the following Tobit regression:
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where Interaction is a binary variable of the analyzed stakeholder group. 
Therefore, for GHG politics, general public, employees, and customers, we 
apply a median split for the total sample. For the interaction variable observa-
tions above (below), the median values are coded with 1 (0). The interactions 
variable for Media is 1 if the firm has at least one controversy for the year 
prior to the CDP disclosure and 0 otherwise. We apply this Tobit regression 
for each single stakeholder group separately. If γ3 is significant, then H3 is 
supported for the respective stakeholder group.
In H4a and H4b, we focus on moderating effects of carbon performance 
and carbon-intensive industries on the results of the ALL STAKE model. We 
analyze three models. The first two models apply either carbon performance 
or carbon-intensive industry as a binary interaction variable. The third model 
is a combination in which we apply both interaction variables. To convert 
carbon performance into a binary variable, we apply a median split within 
each industry (on the ICB subsector level) and year. Firms above the median 
are good carbon performers, and we assign a value of 1 to the carbon perfor-
mance interaction variable. All other observations are classified as poor (or 
below median) carbon performance, and we assign a value of 0. The definition 
of carbon-intensive industries is based on the CDP’s definition (CDP, 2008).8 
Carbon-intensive industries are chemicals and pharmaceuticals; construction 
and building products; manufacturing; oil and gas; raw materials, mining, 
paper, and packaging; transport and logistics; and utilities. Non-carbon-
intensive industries are financial services; hospitality, leisure, and business 
services; retail and consumer; technology; and media and telecoms.
Sample Description
The study sample comprises all firms that are included in the CDP Global 
500, S&P 500, or FTSE 350 reports from 2008 to 2011 and for which all 
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necessary financial and environmental data are available in the Thomson 
Reuters Worldscope and Asset4 databases. The sample consists of a total of 
1,120 firms with 3,631 firm-year observations. Table 2 presents the sample 
composition by country, industry, and year. Due to the inclusion of CDP’s 
S&P 500 and FTSE 350 reports, our sample is biased toward U.S. and U.K. 
firms. Table 2 also reports the mean disclosure score. Germany (71.22) and 
Australia (66.50) show high disclosure scores, whereas China (13.03) and 
India (23.33) rank very low. For industries, the mean disclosure score ranges 
from 34.02 for the Energy sector to 54.96 for Consumer Staples. The yearly 
analysis reveals that from 2008 to 2011, the number of observations (629-
1,050) and the mean disclosure score (42.83-44.65) have increased, with a 
low of 41.54 in 2009.
For countries, the table provides details for the 12 most comprehensive 
countries. All other countries are consolidated into “Other.” These countries 
are as follows (in order of decreasing number of observations): Russian 
Federation, the Netherlands, Italy, South Korea, Sweden, Singapore, South 
Africa, Norway, Indonesia, Belgium, Denmark, Turkey, Finland, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Portugal, Thailand, Luxembourg, Poland, Austria, Czech Republic, 
Greece, and Morocco.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in Table 3.
Disclosure score is the carbon disclosure score as assigned by the CDP. 
Theoretically, the score ranges from 0 (no response or no answers provided) 
to 100 (complete disclosure). CARBON PERFORMANCE is reported as the 
negative value of Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions divided by net sales (in 
further analysis, this variable is z-standardized by year and industry). We use 
the negative value for the better interpretation of results as good carbon per-
formers have low CO2 emissions relative to net sales and industry. Thus, 
using negation, good performers have high values for CARBON 
PERFORMANCE. GHG POLITICS is the negative value of the score pro-
vided by Germanwatch and ranges from  −5 (very poor GHG politics) to −1 
(very good GHG politics). GENERAL PUBLIC is the voice and accountabil-
ity measure from the World Government Index and ranges from 0 (very poor) 
to 100 (very good). MEDIA is the sum of controversies a firm has faced from 
the Datastream Asset4 Database. EMPLOYEES and CUSTOMERS are 
scores from the Datastream Asset4 Database and range from 0 (very poor) to 
100 (very good). FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE is net income divided by 
the book value of equity. LEVERAGE is total debt capital/total assets. 
VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of market-adjusted monthly returns 
over 12 months. SIZE is the common logarithm of total assets. CAPITAL 
INVESTMENT is capital investments divided by total sales. CODE LAW is 
a binary variable, which is 0 for common-law countries (countries with a 
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Table 2. Industry and Continent Affiliation of Sample Firms.
Disclosure score−Descriptive 
statistics
 Observations
Relative 
proportion M SD Median
Country
 USA 1,509 41.56% 44.33 34.10 53
 United Kingdom 884 24.35% 45.53 31.88 57
 Japan 218 6.00% 37.15 33.01 43
 China 137 3.77% 13.03 27.80 0
 France 113 3.11% 56.47 32.05 64
 Canada 96 2.64% 45.86 31.97 59
 Germany 77 2.12% 71.22 26.71 78
 Spain 49 1.35% 50.82 39.03 66
 Australia 48 1.32% 66.50 25.93 72
 Switzerland 48 1.32% 58.54 33.20 68.5
 India 46 1.27% 23.33 33.13 0
 Brazil 43 1.18% 46.09 34.44 57
 Other 363 10.00% 31.27 36.36 0
Industry
 Consumer 
discretionary
511 14.07% 40.91 33.97 51
 Consumer staples 278 7.66% 54.96 30.89 63
 Energy 307 8.45% 34.02 33.90 33
 Financials 755 20.79% 39.08 35.51 50
 Health care 237 6.53% 47.09 32.32 55
 Industrials 493 13.58% 41.84 33.09 52
 Information technology 358 9.86% 45.46 34.01 54.5
 Materials 291 8.01% 50.40 33.97 59
 Telecommunications 147 4.05% 38.16 35.75 44
 Utilities 254 7.00% 46.17 36.79 55.5
Year
 2008 629 17.32% 42.83 30.02 53
 2009 937 25.81% 41.54 32.85 50
 2010 1,015 27.95% 42.81 34.82 54
 2011 1,050 28.92% 44.65 37.98 58
Total 3,631 100.00% 43.02 34.51 53
Note. The table provides an overview of the sample composition by country, industry (following ICB 
classification), and year. Descriptive statistics show the number of observations, the relative number 
of observations in percent of total observations, the mean, standard deviation (SD), and median of the 
disclosure score.
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British legal origin) and 1 for code-law countries. SIGNATORIES is (shares 
held by institutional investors / total shares) × 100. All independent variables 
are measured in the year prior to the DISCLOSURE SCORE.
Results and Discussion
Table 4 shows the correlation table for the Bravais-Pearson coefficients for 
the dependent and independent variables. Interestingly, the carbon disclosure 
score is significantly correlated with all variables except for GHG politics 
and financial performance. The strongest correlations between variables are 
−0.38 (between General public and Code law) and +0.43 (between Size and 
Code law). Hence, we expect no problems from multicollinearity.9
Table 5 reports the results of the basic model (ALL STAKE) compared 
with a model without stakeholder variables (NO STAKE). Furthermore, to 
analyze whether the stakeholder variables are a moderator for the relation-
ship between the carbon disclosure score and carbon performance, we apply 
interaction models for each of the five stakeholder variables.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics.
M SD 10% Median 90%
Dependent variable
 Disclosure score 43.02 34.51 0 53 85
Independent variable
 Carbon performance −0.48 1.42 −1.06 −0.04 −0.004
Stakeholders
 GHG politics −3.60 0.96 −4.90 −3.85 −2.26
 General public 82.41 19.37 63.98 86.73 92.89
 Media 1.19 2.93 0 0 4
 Employees 63.52 26.44 23.21 70.00 93.65
 Customers 61.20 28.45 17.00 64.61 96.06
Controls
 Financial performance 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.14 0.34
 Leverage 0.24 0.16 0.02 0.22 0.46
 Volatility 8.50 5.09 4.55 7.31 13.25
 Size 16.63 1.72 14.48 16.55 18.81
 Capital investment 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.23
 Code law 0.27 0.44 0 0 1
 Signatories 7.33 8.88 0 5 20
Note. The table reports descriptive statistics of the dependent variable disclosure score and 
all independent variables.
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Table 4. Correlations Table.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) DISCLOSURE SCORE 1  
(2) CARBON PERFORMANCE −.04** 1  
(3) GHG POLITICS .01 −.03* 1  
(4) GENERAL PUBLIC .27*** −.01 −.04** 1  
(5) MEDIA .25*** −.03 −.10*** .08*** 1  
(6) EMPLOYEES .19*** .04** .16*** −.03* −.01 1  
(7) CUSTOMERS .22*** .02 .05*** .07*** −.04** .29*** 1  
(8) FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE .02 −.01 .04** −.04** .010 .08*** .03* 1  
(9) LEVERAGE .03** .09*** −.05*** .10*** −.04** −.04** .08*** −.02 1  
(10) VOLATILITY −.16*** −.03* .010 .01 −.07*** −.09*** −.08*** −.19*** .08*** 1  
(11) SIZE .24*** −.04** −.14*** −.16*** .31*** .18*** .27*** −.14*** .10*** −.09*** 1  
(12) CAPITAL INVESTMENT −.08*** .18*** .04** −.04** −.05*** .00 −.07*** −.11*** .20*** .08*** −.06*** 1  
(13) CODE LAW −.07*** −.03* .22*** −.38*** −.07*** .15*** .20*** −.02 .03* −.05*** .43*** .00 1
(14) SIGNATORIES −.06*** .02 −.09*** .19*** −.10*** −.06*** −.09*** −.04** .02 .15*** −.34*** −.34*** −.06***
Note. The table contains Bravais-Pearson correlations of the dependent variable (DISCLOSURE SCORE) and all independent variables.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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Table 5. Basic Model and Shareholder Interactions.
INTERACTION MODELS
Variables NO STAKE ALL STAKE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CARBON PERFORMANCE 3.951*** (4.49) 2.794*** (3.43) 0.984 (0.68) 2.722** (2.30) 3.715*** (3.70) 4.471*** (3.62) 4.139*** (3.68)
Stakeholder variablesa
 (1) GHG POLITICS 5.393*** (6.04) 15.123*** (7.72)  
 (2) GENERAL PUBLIC 0.686*** (13.94) 23.827*** (14.71)  
 (3) MEDIA 1.566*** (5.61) 9.979*** (5.35)  
 (4) EMPLOYEES 0.206*** (6.77) 12.463*** (7.84)  
 (5) CUSTOMERS 0.191*** (6.62) 14.614*** (9.00)
Interactions
 w/CARBON PERFORMANCE 4.339** (4.41) 1.129 (0.67) 0.950 (0.47) −0.867 (−0.50) −0.660 (−0.37)
Control variables
 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE −0.875 (−0.22) −2.458 (−0.67) −1.274 (−0.33) −0.858 (−0.23) −1.325 (−0.34) −3.642 (−0.94) −2.270 (−0.59)
 LEVERAGE 3.013 (0.56) −1.223 (−0.24) 5.080 (0.96) 4.819 (0.93) 4.097 (0.77) 4.678 (0.88) 1.027 (0.19)
 VOLATILITY −1.534*** (−8.02) −1.391*** (−7.77) −1.562*** (−8.23) −1.581*** (−8.52) −1.524*** (−8.01) −1.496*** (−7.89) −1.518*** (−8.03)
 SIZE 12.015*** (19.84) 9.841*** (14.45) 13.017*** (21.09) 13.491*** (22.55) 10.481*** (15.80) 11.606*** (19.30) 11.012*** (18.16)
 CAPITAL INVESTMENT 3.118 (0.52) 2.152 (0.39) 1.127 (0.19) −1.609 (−0.28) 3.435 (0.58) 1.218 (0.21) 2.588 (0.44)
 CODE LAW −27.371*** (−13.29) −21.464*** (−9.76) −32.253*** (−15.01) −29.852*** (−14.82) −24.446*** (−11.55) −28.533*** (−13.90) −29.139*** (−14.19)
 SIGNATORIES 0.050 (0.51) −0.015 (−0.16) 0.083 (0.85) 0.089 (0.94) 0.036 (0.37) 0.024 (0.24) 0.052 (0.53)
Intercept −152.53*** (−13.61) −183.7*** (−15.20) −182.75*** (−15.39) −182.67*** (−16.45) −131.55*** (−11.18) −152.48*** (−13.73) −142.73*** (−12.85)
Observations 3,631 3,631 3,631 3,631 3,631 3,631 3,631
Chi-square (p value) 666.20 (0.000) 1,136.76 (0.000) 732.89 (0.000) 882.24 (0.000) 695.33 (0.000) 727.56 (0.000) 746.82 (0.000)
Log likelihood −13,610.87 −13,375.59 −13,688.52 −13,502.85 −13,596.30 −13.580.19 −13,570.56
Note. This table reports results of the Tobit models with the disclosure score as the dependent variable and independent variables as identified in the first column. The 
models are “NO STAKE” which does not contain stakeholder variables and “ALL STAKE” which contains all stakeholder variables, but no interaction terms; “Interaction 
Models” contain the interaction term for one stakeholder variable and its interactions with CARBON PERFORMANCE. The Interaction Models are numbered (1) for good 
versus poor GHG politics, (2) for high versus. low influence of the general public of the people in political processes, (3) for firms with controversies versus firms without 
controversies, (4) for high versus low employee orientation, and (5) for high versus low customer orientation. The table reports the slope coefficient and the t-value (in 
parenthesis).
aFor the model “ALL STAKE,” the stakeholder variables are continuous variables as presented in Table 3 and defined in “Research Design” section. For the interaction 
models, the stakeholder variables are binary variables where 1 (0) indicates a high (low) degree of stakeholder orientation based on a median split. The exception is MEDIA, 
which is 1 for firms with one or more controversies and 0 for firms without any controversies.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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Table 5 indicates that the carbon disclosure score is positively associated 
(p < .01) with carbon performance for both the NO STAKE and the ALL 
STAKE model. This relationship means that lower emissions intensity in 
relation to the industry average (better carbon performance) is associated 
with higher carbon disclosure. Our results confirm the results of previous 
studies on the association of environmental (carbon) disclosure with environ-
mental (carbon) performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Dawkins & Fraas, 2011; Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez, 2010) and thus 
support H1. Our results show that signs and significances for the association 
between carbon performance and carbon disclosure do not change when 
stakeholder variables are added to the model. This lack of change is evidence 
that the omitted variable problem, which occurs when a study does not 
include important independent variables in the research design, does not lead 
to different conclusions in relation to the previous studies.
Results of the ALL STAKE model clearly show that all stakeholder vari-
ables are associated with the carbon disclosure score with high significance 
levels (p < .01). We find that firms headquartered in countries with stronger 
GHG politics and more potential for the general public to influence the regu-
latory process (measured as higher general public) disclose more carbon-
related information. This finding means, in general, that the institutional 
setting is significantly associated with the carbon disclosure score, confirm-
ing the previous results of Kolk and Perego (2010) and Chen and Bouvain 
(2009) for other environmental issues. In addition, we confirm the results of 
Freedman and Jaggi (2005) and Luo et al. (2012) that the country where a 
firm is headquartered is also related to carbon disclosure.
Furthermore, the firms that experience more media pressure are likely to 
increase their carbon-related disclosure. In addition, we show that employees 
and customers as stakeholders are positively associated with the carbon dis-
closure score of firms, representing two stakeholder groups that had not been 
analyzed, to our best knowledge, in the empirical literature on carbon disclo-
sure to date.
Interestingly, the sign and significance of carbon performance remains 
stable when comparing the NO STAKE and the ALL STAKE models. 
However, the model fit increases considerably when analyzing the chi-square 
from 666.20 (NO STAKE) to 1,136.76 (ALL STAKE) which means that the 
inclusion of stakeholder variables better explains the carbon disclosure score. 
Therefore, the stakeholder variables should be included in the future carbon 
disclosure research. All control variables are robust for all models shown in 
Table 5. To sum up, the results support our H2.
Next, we analyze the possible moderating effects of the stakeholder vari-
ables. Note, that for the purpose of the interaction model, the stakeholder 
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variables are calculated as binary variables, thus differentiating between high 
and low stakeholder relevance. The interaction models show, again, that all 
stakeholder variables are significant. This means that results of the ALL 
STAKE model are robust to different calculations of the stakeholder vari-
ables. We find a moderating effect supporting our H3 only for GHG politics. 
We find that in countries with weak GHG politics (GHG politics binary = 0), 
there is no significant relationship between the carbon disclosure score and 
carbon performance (coefficient: 0.984). However, in countries with strong 
GHG politics, there is a considerably stronger positive relationship between 
the carbon disclosure score and carbon performance (coefficient: 5.323 = 
0.984 + 4.339). We interpret this result to mean that in countries with strong 
GHG politics, the firms are not only directly motivated to increase their car-
bon disclosure (coefficient: 15.123, p < .01) but also have additional incen-
tives to further increase their disclosure activities if their carbon performance 
is good.
For all other stakeholder variables (general public, media, employees, and 
customers), we find no significant changes in the coefficients of the carbon 
disclosure score between high and low stakeholder relevance: There is no 
significance for the relevant interaction term in Table 5. This result means 
that carbon performance and stakeholder relevance are both significantly 
associated with the carbon disclosure score, but independent of one another. 
In summary, H3 is supported only for GHG politics.
The results of testing the moderating effect of industry affiliation and car-
bon performance on the association between carbon disclosure score and 
stakeholder relevance are summarized in Table 6.
The results support the notion that carbon performance acts as a moderator 
for stakeholder variables. We find that the good carbon performers generally 
show a higher disclosure score (coefficient: 40.728, p value < .01), which is 
consistent with the positive and significant results of the analysis in Table 5. 
Furthermore, we find that the good carbon performers show a stronger rela-
tionship between the carbon disclosure score and GHG politics and weaker 
relationships between the carbon disclosure score and general public as well 
as employees. However, although there are some moderating effects, the gen-
eral signs of the relationships are unchanged. For example, for poor carbon 
performers, the coefficient of GHG politics is 4.226 (p < .01) and for good 
carbon performers it is 7.482 (4.226 + 3.256). This result shows again that 
good carbon performance is an enforcing moderator for the country-specific 
relationship between GHG politics and the carbon disclosure score. For poor 
carbon performers, the general public variable has a coefficient of 0.792 (p < 
.01), and for good carbon performers, the coefficient is 0.519 (0.792 − 0.273). 
For employee orientation, poor carbon performers show a coefficient of 
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Table 6. Results of Carbon Performance and Carbon Industry Interactions.
Variables
Carbon  
performance
Carbon-intensive 
industries
Carbon performance 
and carbon-intensive 
industries
 CARBON 
PERFORMANCE
2.395 (2.13)**  
Stakeholder variables
 GHG POLITICS 4.226 (3.54)*** 5.193 (4.49)*** 3.149 (1.98)**
 GENERAL PUBLIC 0.792 (12.95)*** 0.756 (12.01)*** 0.954 (11.56)***
 MEDIA 1.764 (4.79)*** 1.544 (4.44)*** 1.766 (3.86)***
 EMPLOYEES 0.274 (6.35)*** 0.228 (5.54)*** 0.296 (4.92)***
 CUSTOMERS 0.164 (4.14)*** 0.166 (4.33)*** 0.155 (2.80)***
Interaction variables
 CARBON 
PERFORMANCE
40.728 (3.57)*** 70.331 (4.62)***
 CARBON 
INDUSTRY
18.603 (1.28) 44.458 (2.58)**
 BOTH −69.303 (−2.99)***
Interaction with CARBON PERFORMANCE
 GHG POLITICS 3.256 (2.07)** 5.181 (2.42)**
 GENERAL PUBLIC −0.273 (−2.84)*** −0.532 (−4.18)***
 MEDIA −0.413 (−0.85) −0.428 (−0.67)
 EMPLOYEES −0.143 (−2.41)** −0.133 (−1.65)*
 CUSTOMERS 0.056 (1.02) 0.025 (0.34)
Interaction with CARBON INDUSTRIES
 CARBON 
PERFORMANCE
0.829 (0.51)  
 GHG POLITICS 0.465 (0.29) 2.531 (1.14)
 GENERAL PUBLIC −0.172 (−1.84)* −0.384 (−3.23)***
 MEDIA 0.065 (0.13) 0.031 (0.04)
 EMPLOYEES −0.051 (−0.85) −0.043 (−0.49)
 CUSTOMERS 0.057 (1.03) 0.026 (0.33)
Interaction with CARBON PERFORMANCE AND CARBON INDUSTRIES
 GHG POLITICS −4.427 (−1.41)
 GENERAL PUBLIC 0.619 (3.14)***
 MEDIA 0.015 (0.02)
 EMPLOYEES −0.042 (−0.35)
 CUSTOMERS 0.069 (0.62)
Control variables
 FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE
−2.391 (−0.62) −2.314 (−0.63) −1.997 (−0.54)
 LEVERAGE −1.134 (−0.22) −1.963 (−0.39) −2.030 (−0.40)
 VOLATILITY −1.384 (−7.72)*** −1.391 (−7.75)*** −1.391 (−7.72)***
 SIZE 9.874 (14.47)*** 9.879 (14.43)*** 9.920 (14.47)***
(continued)
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0.274 (p < .01), while good carbon performers show a coefficient of 0.131 
(0.274 − 0.143). This result means that carbon disclosure is driven by the 
general public and employees, but the effect is weaker when carbon perfor-
mance is good. Thus, poor carbon performers disclose more if they are 
employee oriented or if the general public has a stronger influence on politi-
cal processes.
Analyzing the moderation effects of belonging to carbon-intense indus-
tries, we find that firms with a good carbon performance in the same type of 
industry disclose more (coefficient: 2.395 and p < .05).10 For the carbon indus-
try itself, we do not find a significant direct effect, and the moderating effect 
does only concern one stakeholder variable on a low level of significance (p < 
.1): general public. Thus, carbon disclosure appears to be driven rather by the 
firm-specific carbon performance relative to the industry and not by its indus-
try affiliation. The general finding that carbon-intensive versus non-carbon-
intensive industries deliver largely similar results is consistent with Reid and 
Toffel (2009) who also analyze a moderating effect of a firm’s industry affili-
ation with carbon disclosure and only found weak evidence.
The combination of both the carbon performance and the carbon industry 
interaction variables shows an additional moderating effect. General public is 
moderated by carbon performance and carbon-intensive industries as well as 
Variables
Carbon  
performance
Carbon-intensive 
industries
Carbon performance 
and carbon-intensive 
industries
 CAPITAL 
INVESTMENT
0.765 (0.14) 2.991 (0.53) 1.850 (0.33)
 CODE LAW −20.597 (−9.26)*** −21.499 (−9.77)*** −20.485 (−9.20)***
 SIGNATORIES −0.037 (−0.40) −0.012 (−0.13) −0.026 (−0.28)
Intercept −200.135 (−15.41)*** −193.622 (−12.46)*** −221.312 (−13.06)***
Observations 3,631 3,631 3,631
Chi-square (p value) 1,142.55 (0.000) 1,141.81 (0.000) 1,160.30 (0.000)
Log-likelihood −13,372.69 −13,373.07 −13,363.82
Note. This table reports the results of Tobit models with interaction terms for CARBON PERFORMANCE 
and CARBON INDUSTRY. Therefore, CARBON PERFORMANCE is a binary variable in the models 
“Carbon Performance” and “Carbon Performance and Carbon Industries.” We apply a median split per 
year and ICB Subsector for Carbon Performance. This variable is 1 for good carbon performers (lower 
50% of GHG emissions divided by net sales) and 0 otherwise. CARBON INDUSTRY is 1 for carbon-
intensive industries as defined by CDP (chemicals and pharmaceuticals; construction and building products; 
manufacturing; oil and gas; raw materials, mining, paper, and packaging; transport and logistics; and utilities) 
and 0 otherwise. The table reports the slope coefficient and the t-value (in parenthesis).
*p < 0. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
Table 6. (continued)
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the combination of both, with negative signs for the single interaction terms. 
Looking on the coefficients for the interactions terms for general public, there 
appears to be a trade-off between general public and carbon performance or 
carbon-intensive industry concerning the relationship with the carbon disclo-
sure score. Furthermore, we find that the effect of good carbon performance 
is larger (70.331, p < .01) than the effect of industry affiliation (44.458, p < 
.05). In addition, firms with a good carbon performance from a carbon-inten-
sive industry also tend to disclose more information than the poor carbon 
performers from non-carbon-intensive industries (coefficient: 45.486 = 
70.331 + 44.458 − 69.303) but less than the good carbon performers from 
non-carbon industries (coefficient: 70.331, p < .01). Thus, we find a joint 
effect of both carbon performance and carbon industry which partially sup-
ports H4a and H4b.
Overall, we find that the direct and moderating effects of carbon perfor-
mance are stronger and more pronounced for the carbon-intensive industries. 
Interestingly, whether we analyze carbon-intensive or non-carbon-intensive 
industries appears to have no influence on the inferences from stakeholder 
variables. Of course, this result is specific to our CDP setting. However, it is 
worthwhile analyzing other environmental disclosure settings because the 
scope of inferences and analyses can be widened considerably when research-
ers do not need to focus on specific industries for environmental disclosure 
research.
Conclusion
Stakeholder theory is often mentioned in the motivation of empirical carbon 
disclosure studies. However, analyzing literature that studies the relationship 
between environmental disclosure and environmental performance reveals 
that generally shareholder relevance is analyzed while non-financial stake-
holder groups are often ignored. Thus, this study contributes to the literature 
by expanding the scope of the current empirical studies to include measures 
for non-financial stakeholder groups and especially to include employees and 
customers.
The results support a direct positive relationship between carbon disclo-
sure and the relevance of all stakeholder groups analyzed: governmental 
GHG politics, the general public, the media, employees, and customers. This 
positive relationship means that these stakeholder groups are regarded as rel-
evant stakeholders to whom the firms react by disclosing their climate change 
related efforts. This result is strong and consistent across different models 
and measurements. However, our results also show that the significances and 
signs of the relationship between carbon disclosure and carbon performance 
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do not change if the stakeholder variables are not considered. This absence of 
change is evidence that the omitted variable problem, which occurs when a 
study fails to include important independent variables in its research design, 
does not necessarily lead to different conclusions in relation to the previous 
studies. However, this finding is based on the specific setting of CDP. It is 
uncertain whether this result is transferable to other environmental disclosure 
settings (such as settings with more discretionary potential) or even sustain-
ability disclosure settings. Therefore, the authors recommend for future 
research that researchers include a variety of stakeholder variables because 
the extended ALL STAKE model better explains carbon disclosure.
The authors also analyze the extent to which stakeholders act as modera-
tors of the relationship between the carbon disclosure and carbon perfor-
mance, and find that only GHG politics acts as a moderator. Generally, in 
countries with strong GHG politics, we find a stronger relationship between 
the carbon disclosure score and carbon performance. This reveals that gov-
ernments have direct and indirect influence on a firm’s carbon reporting 
behavior. The other stakeholder variables for media, employees, and custom-
ers appear to be directly related to the carbon disclosure score. Furthermore, 
we show that the effects of all stakeholder variables add up to a total effect on 
climate disclosure, but so far seem to be rather exchangeable. Future research 
might explore multiplicative associations between stakeholder variables.
Furthermore, in an extension to the previous literature, we look at a cross-
section of industries and investigate the differences between carbon-intensive 
and non-carbon-intensive industries regarding stakeholder relevance. In gen-
eral, we find that firm-specific carbon performance better explains carbon 
disclosure compared to industry affiliation. Finally, we expand the current 
literature focusing predominantly on the United States by using an interna-
tional sample of firms for our measures. This expansion allows us to more 
thoroughly explore and confirm the importance of country-specific stake-
holder groups such as the government and the general public for carbon 
disclosure.
Our study confronts both data and methodological limitations. Not all 
country-specific data, such as TRI and KLD for the United States, can be 
applied for an international sample such as ours. However, our setting of 
climate change is global by nature and in the focus of recent empirical 
research (Luo et al., 2012; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Stanny, 2013). Results of our 
study are only transferable to climate-change issues. We identified climate 
change to be in the focus of current public debate and, therefore, to be of 
special interest to firms and stakeholders. It may also be interesting to expand 
our study to the wider field of environmental performance or sustainability in 
general. However, the data for environmental and sustainability performance 
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is at least partially industry-specific, currently unavailable for a large sample 
on a global scale, and much more complex than that for climate-change 
issues.
The representatives of stakeholder groups such as government, the general 
public, the media, employees, and customers can use our findings as an indi-
cation that they are regarded as relevant stakeholders in terms of their claims 
on the disclosure on climate-change-related information. For regulators, our 
findings demonstrate that a stringent climate-change policy, despite its 
unquestioned usefulness for the carbon performance of firms, has a positive 
relationship with carbon disclosure. This study is potentially of interest to 
public-policy makers who may consider introducing (further) regulation in 
this important area. Accordingly, the results of our study improve the under-
standing of the country-specific attributes and the stakeholder relevance vari-
ables that have significant relationships with carbon disclosure. Firms and 
analysts must be aware that in addition to carbon and financial performance, 
also non-financial stakeholders need to be considered as relevant drivers of 
carbon disclosure.
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Notes
 1. Z-standardization means that for each firm, the authors calculate −(CO2-ratioit − 
CO2-averageit) / CO2-std.deviationjt, where CO2-ratioit is firm i’s estimated CO2 
emissions divided by total assets in year t; CO2-averagejt is the mean of all CO2 
ratios of firm i’s corresponding industry j in year t; and CO2-std.deviationjt is the 
standard deviation of all CO2 ratios of firm i’s corresponding industry j in year t.
 2. Current data are available online at www.govindicators.org. Other governance 
indicators are “Political Stability,” “No Violence,” “Government Effectiveness,” 
“Regulatory Quality,” “Rule of Law,” and “Control of Corruption.” All indicators 
are highly correlated with each other. Therefore, only one indicator should be used 
in the empirical models to avoid problems of multicollinearity. However, when 
we apply any other governance indicator, the results are qualitatively similar.
 3. The measure covers all controversies as summarized by Asset4. Specifically, 
these are controversies regarding accounting, anti-competition, biodiversity, busi-
ness ethics, child labor, consumers, critical countries, diversity and opportunity, 
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employee health and safety, environment, freedom of association, general share-
holder rights, human rights, indigenous people, insider dealings, intellectual prop-
erty, management compensation, product impact media, product responsibility, 
public health, social exclusion, spills and pollution, tax fraud, wages, and working 
conditions.
 4. Alternative measures such as return on assets, return on sales, and Tobin’s Q lead 
to qualitatively similar results.
 5. An alternative calculation (total debt divided by book value of equity) leads to 
qualitatively similar results.
 6. Alternatively, we applied a beta calculated on a weekly basis for the 1 year prior 
to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) disclosure and based on a worldwide 
market index. The results are qualitatively similar to our measure of volatility.
 7. Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari (2008) analyze and refer to environmental 
performance. However, the same argument is true for carbon performance.
 8. Note that this classification is provided by the CDP and does not directly relate 
to any industry classification system. However, as this classification was specifi-
cally assigned to the CDP reports up to 2008, it is best suited for the analysis. 
Following the ICB industry classification of Datastream, carbon-intensive ICB 
sectors corresponding to these of CDP are oil and gas, basic materials, industri-
als, health care, and utilities. The results do not change considerably when we 
apply the ICB structure instead of the CDP classification.
 9. In further unreported results, the condition number does not exceed the critical 
value in any of the reported models. The condition number shows a maximum 
of 5.66 for the stakeholder interaction models and a maximum of 26.55 for the 
interaction models of carbon performance and carbon industry.
10. Note that for this analysis, carbon performance is again a continuous variable, 
whereas carbon industry is binary.
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